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Employment Discrimination: An Overview of the
1989 Supreme Court Term
Suzanna Sherry*
Many of you have seen or heard in the media much discussion about last term's employment discrimination cases. Indeed,
last term there was an extraordinary amount of activity in the
Supreme Court on employment discrimination. The Court decided
four separate cases under Title VII1 (which prohibits employment
discrimination) and two cases under related laws. One of those
concerned the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, and
the other involved 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which prohibits discrimination
in contractual relations on the basis of race. With all this activity,
it does seem like a lot of new law.
In fact, however, only one of these six cases announced a significant change in the law. All of the other decisions were continuations of developments that have been occurring for the past five
years or more. These were essentially incremental changes in the
law, and were quite predictable on the basis of what the Court had
been doing for some time. So, despite the media claims, and despite the sheer number of employment discrimination cases before
the Court last term, there has not yet been a conservative counterrevolution in employment discrimination law, nor have there yet
been major cutbacks in at least the employment aspects of civil
rights law. I want to emphasize that I have no predictions to make
about what the Court will do in the future; I am only talking about
what it did last term.
Now, as I have said, only one case announced a significant
change in the law, and I will start with that. It is a case called
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.2 Wards Cove was, as most of
these cases were, decided late in the term, in June, and again, as
with most of the cases, it was a five to four decision. Before I describe the case, I should provide a little background for those of
you who do not know any Title VII law.
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. A.B. 1976, Middlebury College;
J.D. 1979, University of Chicago.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
2. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
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There are two basic causes of action under Title VII: disparate treatment and disparate impact. In a disparate treatment
case, the plaintiff is alleging, and is required to prove, that the employer intentionally discriminated against him or her. A disparate
treatment case thus involves a claim that the employer's real motivation was something like: "I will not hire you because you are a
minority or because you are a woman." In this type of case, there
must be discriminatory intent on the part of the employer, and the
plaintiff has the burden of proving intent. There are, of course, a
variety of ways a plaintiff can do that.
In a disparate impact case, however, there is no allegation of
intentional discrimination. The plaintiff is not required to prove
discriminatory intent, nor can the employer escape liability by
proving lack of discriminatory intent. Instead, a disparate impact
cause of action arises when the employer uses a neutral criterion
that has a disparate impact or disproportionately negative effect on
minorities or women. Cases involving high school diplomas, pen
and paper tests, agility tests, and so on are the most common examples of disparate impact. In these cases, the employer has no
deliberate purpose or intention of keeping minorities or women
out of the workplace, and yet the particular neutral criteria which
apply to all applicants have the effect of keeping more women or
more minorities out of the workplace. Thus, the crux of a disparate impact cause of action is that although everyone takes
whatever test is involved, whites or males pass it at a higher rate.
The Wards Cove case involved disparate impact and had
nothing to do with disparate treatment. So, as far as anybody
knows, the Court has not changed the standards for disparate
treatment. Disparate impact, however, was changed significantly
in Wards Cove. The case involved the claim that almost all of the
unskilled workers--cannery workers at the fish packing plantwere minorities,, while all of the skilled and clerical workers were
white. Plaintiffs claimed, therefore, that something had a disparate impact. The Court rejected that claim. In doing so, the Court
began with several conclusions that were quite predictable and
quite in accordance with the pre-existing law.
The first thing the Court said was that you cannot compare
the number of skilled workers to the number of unskilled workers
and assume that a racial imbalance shows a disparate impact. You
must compare the work force to the right population; in a case like
Wards Cove, the right population is the population that is applying
for the skilled positions. If the population applying for the skilled
positions had consisted of significantly more minorities than the
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employer's skilled work force did, then there might have been a
disparate impact, according to the Court. But the Court would not
assume that all of the people who were unskilled necessarily
wanted to be in the skilled positions. Essentially, lawyers in that
case made what is a fairly common mistake--comparing the wrong
populations. This mistake had been noted earlier by lower courts
and by the Supreme Court in other contexts.
The second thing that the Court said is that even where there
is a disparity between minority applicants and minorities hired,
plaintiffs still must show what is causing the disparity. That is, the
plaintiff must point to a particular employment practice that has a
disparate impact, and cannot simply rely on a bottom-line disparity
between the percentage of minorities applying for the job and the
percentage of minorities hired. The Court said that plaintiffs must
identify a specific employment practice-something the plaintiffs
in Wards Cove had failed to do.
I want to note a few points about this "particular practice"
holding. First, it was not unexpected. A year earlier, three of the
Justices had concurred in an opinion written by Justice O'Connor
requiring the same thing.3 All that happened last term was that
the four obtained their fifth vote. A more important precedent for
this aspect of Wards Cove is an opinion, authored about eight
years ago by Justice Brennan, in a case called Connecticut v. Teal.4
In Teal, the Court had held exactly the converse: where the plaintiff shows that a specific practice has a disparate impact, the employer is liable even if there is bottom-line equality in the work
force. In other words, if the employer uses a pen and paper test
which screens out a disproportionate number of minorities, and
then from the pool of eligible whites and minorities chooses more
minorities to make up for that disproportionate impact-and thus
the percentage of minorities in the work force is identical to the
percentage of the minorities who applied-the employer is still liable under Teal. Wards Cove thus cited Teal for the proposition
that bottom-line effects and particular practices are not to be
equated.
In addition to extending Teal in this way, the Court in Wards
Cove went further than it had to in delineating a disparate impact
cause of action. I have just suggested that the plaintiffs in Wards
Cove had not made out a prima facie case: they used the wrong statistics, and they failed to point to a particular practice causing the
disparate impact. The case could have stopped there and by all
3. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988).

4. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
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rights should have stopped there. Part of what makes this case
significant, beyond the impact that it will have upon litigation, is
that the Court did not stop there, but instead seems to be sending
a message that it is aggressively going to make new law in the civil
rights area.
What the Court did was to assume that the plaintiff had
made out a prima facie case. Under long-established precedent,
the employer would then be required to show that there was a
"business necessity" for the particular practice causing the disparate impact. That is, the employer would be required to show that
business needs required the use of that particular employment criterion as a screening device.
The Court in Wards Cove watered down that "business necessity" test in two ways. First, it moved the burden of proof from
the employer to the employee; the plaintiff now has to prove the
lack of a business justification rather than the employer having to
prove the existence of a business justification. Second, it diluted
the substance of the test, changing it from "business necessity,"
which is somewhat equivalent to a compelling interest in constitutional law, to "business justification," which seems to be much
closer to rational basis in constitutional law. Wards Cove held that
the employee has to show that the particular practice does not
"significantly serve a legitimate business interest." So, not only is
the burden now on the plaintiff to show lack of a significant business interest, but the very idea of significant business interest has
been made more lenient.
This change in the standard will have a significant effect on
litigating disparate impact cases. It will make disparate impact
cases much harder for plaintiffs to win because, at least in some
circuits, the business necessity defense has been difficult for employers to prove. They essentially had to prove that there was no
other way for them to get qualified workers except to use the challenged practices. It is now going to be much easier for employers
to defend practices that have a disparate impact. However, we
have not seen the end of it. There will still be plenty of litigation
to determine exactly what the Court meant by "significantly serving a legitimate business interest." There were several hints in the
Court's opinion that it did not intend a completely toothless standard. Thus, the best constitutional analogy might be quasi-strict
scrutiny rather than rational basis. I suspect that the employer
will need a good reason, but not a really terrific reason, to use the
practice. The change in burden of proof is not likely to have as
great an effect on litigation, for several reasons. The employer is
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still required to produce evidence of a legitimate business interest,
and liberal discovery rules will allow plaintiffs to explore the proffered evidence quite closely.
I also think that even the change in the burden of proof is
partly the result of Brennan's Teal opinion. Recall that disparate
treatment essentially focuses on individual rights ("the employer
refused to hire me personally because of my gender"), whereas disparate impact focuses on group rights (the employer is excluding a
whole group of women or minorities from employment by using
the particular employment criterion or hiring practice). Up until
the Teal case in 1982, the Supreme Court kept these two causes of
action thoroughly distinct. Lower courts often confused them, but
the Supreme Court was fairly clear that disparate impact was essentially a protection against group discrimination and disparate
treatment was protection against individual discrimination. In
Teal, however, Justice Brennan ignored the fact that it was a disparate impact case and used a lot of language about how Title VII
is designed to protect individuals against discrimination. He reasoned that a minority who was excluded by the pen and paper test
was not helped by the fact that the employer then hired more minorities from the eligible pool and, thus, that the excluded minority's individual rights were diminished.
In Teal, Justice Brennan talked about how Title VII is for the
protection of individual rights, and the fact that the group does
well under the employer's practice is irrelevant to whether the
employer is liable to the individual. The majority opinion in
Wards Cove is full of citations to, and quotations from, Teal. In
switching the burden of proof, for example, the Court relied solely
on disparate treatment cases. The burden in disparate impact
cases had always been on the defendant to prove business necessity, but Wards Cove, in effect, said, "That can't be right. The burden of proof has always been on the plaintiff. See ... " and then
listed a whole set of disparate treatment cases. So, the confusion
between disparate treatment and disparate impact, begun in Teal,
may be largely responsible for the Wards Cove holdings.
One other substantive Title VII case from last term is going
to change the law, although only incrementally, and this time in
plaintiffs' favor. That is a case called Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,5 decided in May, again by a five to four vote. Justice
O'Connor provided the fifth vote, combining with the four liberal
Justices. She did not join Justice Brennan's opinion, but she did
concur in the result. Price Waterhouse was a disparate treatment
5. 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).
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case. A disparate treatment case frequently produces the following conundrum: The plaintiff comes forward with enough evidence
to persuade the fact-finder that the employer acted on the basis of
an illicit, discriminatory motive. However, the employer also
comes forward with enough evidence to persuade the fact-finder
that, in fact, the employer also acted on the basis of a perfectly legitimate motive, one which had nothing to do with discrimination.
Now, we are not talking here about a battle of credibility or even a
battle of who has presented sufficient evidence. In such a case,
there is enough evidence that the judge, in fact, believes both
people.
Not every business decision is made for only one reason.
When, in a disparate treatment case, the employment decision was
made for two reasons, one of them illegal discrimination and one
of them perfectly lawful and legitimate (such as that the plaintiff
was fired because she was not doing very good work), what should
a court do? Lower courts have ranged from the most plaintiff-oriented (if discrimination played any role at all in the motive then
the employer was liable) to the most defense-oriented (the plaintiff has to prove that the same decision would have been made
even in the absence of the perfectly legitimate non-discriminatory
motive).
Price Waterhouse involved exactly this type of mixed-motive
circumstance. Five Justices found for the plaintiff, holding that
the standard in such cases is that the employer must prove it
would have made the same decision even in the absence of the discriminatory motive. This is not the most plaintiff-oriented standard possible because the Court held that the employer only has to
meet the "same decision" standard by a preponderance of evidence, not by clear and convincing evidence. Of course, the Court
also rejected holding the employer automatically liable because of
any discriminatory intent. The Court's standard, however, is in
keeping with a long line of civil rights cases over the last twenty
years in other areas. It is also in keeping with our own notions of
civil standards of proof. After all, the plaintiff only has to prove
by a preponderance of evidence that there is discrimination, so it
seems only fair to allow the defendant to avoid the finding of discrimination by showing by a preponderance of the evidence that it
would have acted the same way even in the absence of the discriminatory motive.
Justice O'Connor concurred, rather than join in the majority,
to make explicit that a mixed-motive case does not even arise unless there is evidence that discrimination played a substantial role
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in the decision. The plurality did not address this issue because
there was sufficient evidence that discrimination played an extremely substantial role in this particular employment decision.
Essentially, Justice O'Connor wanted to ensure that if the factfinder believed that the decision was the result of motives that
were 95% legitimate and only 5% discriminatory, the employer
would not have the burden of proving that he or she would have
made the same decision. Justice O'Connor did not quantify, or
even well define, what a substantial role is, so we will see more
litigation on that issue in the future.
The other, and in some ways even more significant, aspect of
the case was whether there was any discrimination at all by the
employer. Price Waterhouse involved an employer's refusal to
make a woman a partner in an accounting firm. While there was
some evidence of overt discrimination, there was not much. Most
of the evidence of discrimination was the result of sex-stereotyping: the partners viewed women as required to behave in certain
ways, and if they did not behave in those ways, then they were not
partnership material. It was not that no women could be partners,
it was that women who did not "behave like women" could not be
partners. One of the partners, for example, urged the plaintiff to
"take a course at charm school." Another partner-one of the
plaintiff's supporters-noted that she had "matured from a toughtalking, somewhat masculine, hard-nosed manager to an authoritative, formidable, but much more appealing lady-partner candidate." And finally, one of her supporters told her that if she
wanted to get a partnership she should "walk more femininely,
talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have
her hair styled, and wear jewelry." That, the Court said, is sex discrimination. (Notice that only five Justices said that it is sex discrimination.) As I said, however, this is probably only an
incremental change in the law, although the case probably would
have been much more astounding if the Court had gone the other
way. So Price Waterhouse is a small step forward for plaintiffs,
Wards Cove is a large step backward for plaintiffs, and everything
else is about six steps sideways.
The other two Title VII cases, both steps sideways, are procedural cases. Both essentially involve variations on the statute of
limitations. The first is Lorance v. AT&T Technologies.6 Lorance
was a five to three decision. Justice O'Connor did not participate,
and Justice Stevens, who usually votes with the liberals, joined
with the normally conservative Justices to make the majority.
6. 109 S. Ct. 2261 (1989).
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Again, some background is necessary. Disparate impact covers almost anything an employer does, except seniority systems.
Imagine that an employer for many years did not hire many women, and then starts hiring women. If a typical seniority agreement is in effect, it means that women are going to have fewer
seniority rights because they were hired more recently. However,
the statute itself explicitly exempts seniority systems from liability, and the Court has held that this means a plaintiff cannot state
a disparate impact cause of action based on a seniority system.
That is, the fact that the seniority system causes fewer women to
be promoted or more women to be laid off does not state a cause of
action for disparate impact even though it seems to have a disparate impact. A court cannot strike down the seniority system because the statute specifically protects it. However, the Court has
also said that if the seniority system was adopted with discriminatory intent, then it is illegal. In other words, if the employer deliberately adopted a seniority system in order to keep women or
minorities at the bottom of the ladder, then it violates Title VII,
but it does not violate Title VII simply by creating a disparate
impact.
In Lorance, plaintiffs were alleging that the employer's seniority system was adopted for discriminatory reasons. If they could
have proven the discriminatory intent, the seniority system would
have been illegal. The problem was that plaintiffs did not bring
the suit within the (very short) period of limitation after the adoption of the seniority system, but instead sued years later. If they
had been able to bring a disparate impact cause of action, they
could have brought it later because the impact would have been
continuing every time that a woman was not promoted or was laid
off. So, every time a woman was harmed by the seniority system
she would have had a cause of action under disparate impact. Unfortunately, there is no cause of action under Title VII for disparate impact resulting from seniority systems. So plaintiffs had to
allege that the system was adopted with discriminatory intent, but
in that case they were challenging the adoption and not the continuing impact, and the limitations period started running as of the
date of adoption. That is all Lorance held, and thus it was neither
particularly surprising nor disturbing. What caused the problem
for the plaintiffs was a combination of two things: (1) Title VII has
a very short statute of limitations, usually a maximum of ninety
days; and (2) Title VII exempts seniority systems from the disparate impact cause of action. In fact, Justice Stevens made quite
clear that he did not like the result but was joining the majority
because the statute left him no other choice.
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Another step sideways was Martin v. Wilks, 7 also a procedural case. Wilks was again a five to four opinion, and involved a
suit by whites challenging an affirmative action consent decree.
Unlike Lorance, plaintiffs in Wilks did have a continuing cause of
action because every time a white was not promoted or not hired
because of this affirmative action consent decree, the white was
harmed. They claimed that this violated Title VII because the employer intentionally discriminated on the basis of race. The substance of that claim is simply a question on the merits of
affirmative action, which I will get to in a moment. Wilks, however, did not reach the merits but only held that indeed, because
the whites were continuously hurt every time the affirmative action consent decree was acted on, they did have a live cause of action. I will return later to the possible effect of this case.
First, however, I want to discuss the two cases that were not
Title VII cases. The first was a fairly minor case called Patterson
v. McLean Credit Union.8 Patterson almost became a major case
because the Court almost overruled long-standing precedent, but
because the Court did not overrule it, the case is of little significance. Patterson involved 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which prohibits discrimination in contractual relations. Section 1981 has been held to
apply to employment contracts, and Patterson was suing for racial
harassment in an employment context. Racial harassment, like
sexual harassment, has long been actionable under Title VII, but
this plaintiff chose to proceed under Section 1981 for a variety of
reasons. The Supreme Court held that racial harassment, while
actionable under Title VII, is not actionable under Section 1981.
Sexual harassment, incidentally, was never actionable under Section 1981 because Section 1981 only applies to race discrimination
and does not apply to gender discrimination. The Court essentially
equalized racial harassment and sexual harassment by saying that
both have to be brought under Title VII and cannot be brought
under Section 1981.
The Court did go a little further than that and said that Section 1981 only applies to the formation of contracts and not to anything that occurs after the formation of the contract. In other
words, if the employer refuses to hire a person on the basis of race,
that is actionable under Section 1981, but if the employer does hire
the person and then treats him or her differently, that might not
be actionable depending on the terms and conditions of the original contract. The reason that I say this is minor is that I cannot
7. 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989).
8. 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
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believe the Court means what it says. I am skeptical for the following reason: the original case extending Section 1981 to private
discrimination involved a private school. The private school was
advertising generally for students but had a racially discriminatory
policy. The Court essentially held that if the school held itself out
that way, it claimed to want to enter into contracts with students
and could not discriminate on the basis of race. If Patterson really
means what it says, then a private school could quite easily accept
all students, minority students as well as white students, and then
flunk out all the minority students at the end of the first semester.
I cannot believe that the Supreme Court is going to let private
schools get away with that. So, while at the moment Section 1981
seems more restricted in scope than it used to be, I just do not
think that the law can possibly stay that way. As soon as there is a
more appealing case, I think this problem with Patterson will be
resolved.
One problem I think the Court had with Patterson is that it
was not a very appealing case. Since it was an employment case, it
fit very nicely into Title VII, and the Court may have believed that
the plaintiff should have brought it under Title VII rather than
under Section 1981. The Court may also have been worried about
treating racial harassment and sexual harassment cases differently, since Section 1981 only applies to race while Title VII applies to both.
The final employment discrimination related case last term
was not a Title VII case but an equal protection case involving affirmative action. That is Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,9 again decided five to four. There is a majority opinion on some parts of the
case but not all; in fact, there was agreement by at least five Justices on several points. Richmond involved a challenge to a minority set-aside program: the city of Richmond had said that some
percentage of contracts by the city had to go to minority-owned
businesses. The Court struck down the program as violative of the
Equal Protection Clause.
Five Justices agreed that reverse discrimination or affirmaaction
by public entities is tested under strict scrutiny, just
tive
like regular discrimination. It does not matter whether the public
entity is accused of discriminating against whites or discriminating
against minorities, that action will still be tested by strict scrutiny.
That is, the action will have to be shown to be necessary to a compelling state interest. The second thing that at least five Justices
agreed on was that remedying prior discrimination is a compelling
9. 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
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state interest. Finally, five Justices agreed that in order for remedying prior discrimination to be a compelling state interest, the
state actor must point to particular prior discrimination committed
by itself. That is, the state actor has to have been involved, either
directly or indirectly, in the prior discrimination. Remedying general societal discrimination is not sufficient to constitute a compelling state interest that would justify affirmative action. This is
what the Court held, and it found that the city of Richmond's affirmative action plan was invalid because there had been no showing of prior government discrimination in the contracting business.
The reason that I say this holding is not significant-unlike
most of the media, but like most knowledgeable commentators-is
essentially that one could have predicted this. Beginning back in
1978 with Bakke,O there has always seemed to be a majority of
Justices who want to test affirmative action by strict scrutiny; the
analysis was only confused because some of those Justices apparently claimed that it was never valid. Justice Scalia seems to come
very close to that in the Richmond case but is willing to go along
with the majority enough so that it is clear that there is a majority
for strict scrutiny. This is something that the Court has been
struggling with for well over a decade, and Richmond in fact represents something of a middle ground. If you recall, in Bakke
there were some Justices who felt that affirmative action was
never appropriate and others who felt that it was essentially always appropriate. Richmond is somewhere in the middle, holding
that remedying prior discrimination is a compelling state interest.
My last point on Richmond involves an issue that did not yet
have a majority, but I am sure that there will be a majority shortly
since the dissent did not address the issue. Justice O'Connor wrote
that the evidence of prior discrimination does not have to be a contemporaneous finding. In other words, at the time the entity enters into an affirmative action program, it has to have some
evidence of discrimination before it, but it can supplement that evidence later in the judicial proceeding. Moreover, there does not
have to be enough evidence to find the entity liable for the prior
discrimination, nor does it have to admit liability for the prior
discrimination.
Three significant questions are left open after Richmond.
The first is the question of federal power. Recall the Fullilove
case,'1 which upheld a federal set-aside similar to the municipal
program involved in Richmond. In Richmond, Justice O'Connor
10. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
11. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
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was careful to distinguish Fullilove, so there is no question that
while states and cities must prove complicity in prior discrimination, the federal government has much greater leeway. The open
question is whether the federal government could pass a law authorizing states to implement set-asides. Congress would be acting
under its powers under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment,
and it is not clear what would happen in that case.
The second open question is to what extent Richmond applies
to gender. Remember, under equal protection, race is tested by
strict scrutiny and gender is tested by quasi-strict scrutiny. If the
Court follows the equal protection standard, it could lead to the
ironic result that racial affirmative action is tested by strict scrutiny and is hard to justify, while gender discrimination is tested by
only quasi-strict scrutiny and is, therefore, easier to justify. This is
ironic because the reason for the distinction between the race and
gender standards is that race discrimination is thought to be worse,
or more pervasive, or harder to combat, and, therefore, race discrimination is more illegal than gender discrimination.
Finally, the Richmond Court did not deal with other possible
compelling state interests. Specifically, in the academic context, it
has been argued that diversity is a compelling state interest. Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke accepted diversity as a compelling
state interest, and although no other Justice joined his opinion, the
liberal Justices are likely to uphold diversity as a compelling state
interest. In Richmond, however, Justice O'Connor never mentioned diversity as a possible state interest. Of course, since Richmond involved a minority set-aside and there is no reason for
there to be diversity in the contracting business, the Court did not
need to reach the diversity question. The reason that I stress this
as an open question is that Justice Stevens wrote a rather ominous
separate opinion. Justice Stevens is not given to the kind of opinions that Justices Brennan and Marshall write, listing the parade
of horribles supposedly accomplished by the majority holding. The
problem with that type of opinion-and probably the reason why
Justice Stevens avoids them-is that in a subsequent case the majority cites the previous opinion when they really want to decide
whatever it was Justice Brennan was afraid they decided.
Although Justice Stevens ordinarily does not write that kind of
opinion, in Richmond he did. One of his main bases for disagreement with the majority opinion is that the majority never mentioned other possible compelling state interests, including
diversity. I therefore suspect that Justice Stevens suspects the
Justices in the majority are eventually going to reject diversity as a
compelling state interest. There is no other indication of that so
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far, and there is no legal reason not to use diversity as a compelling state interest for now, but, as a matter of prediction, it is significant that Justice Stevens, who is more calm and rational than
some of the other Justices, appears worried about the validity of
diversity as a compelling state interest.
I want to conclude by discussing briefly what these cases
might mean when taken together. One thing that appears clear is
that the Supreme Court thinks that garden-variety discrimination
is gone. The Supreme Court seems to think that a plaintiff who
simply says, "that employer discriminated against me because I'm
black (or female or whatever)," is probably incorrect because most
employers do not do that anymore. On the other hand, the
Supreme Court does seem more sensitive to more subtle discrimination. In particular, the Court is sensitive to two new types of
discrimination. The first is sexual stereotyping. I think the Court
is showing that it can keep up with changes in discriminatory behavior, and when the partnership at Price Waterhouse no longer
says, "we don't want women partners," but instead says, "here are
the kinds of women we would like to have as partners," the
Supreme Court, to its credit, recognizes that statement as a form
of discrimination.
The other form of subtle discrimination that the Court seems
sensitive to is the way that employers have essentially been playing racial politics to avoid any liability. Let me explain what I
mean by that. Prior to Wards Cove (the disparate impact case),
Wilks (which allows challenges to affirmative action consent decrees), and Richmond (which changes at least the equal protection
standards for affirmative action), an employer--especially a public
employer, but even a private employer-would be liable if the
numbers were bad: if there were too many whites and not enough
minorities, that would usually violate Title VII. Under disparate
impact, all the plaintiff had to show was a bottom-line disparity,
and the burden was very high on the employer to prove business
necessity. Thus, if there were a disparity between the number of
minorities that would be expected in the work force and the
number of minorities that were in the work force, the employer
would be liable. That was the way the law was. On the other
hand, given the very lenient standards for affirmative action, employers were almost never liable for adopting affirmative action
programs-especially in settlement of a lawsuit. So, smart employers would simply play by the numbers: they would always adopt an
affirmative action program which would try to get them exactly
the right number of each minority and of women in order to avoid
any liability to anyone. I think the combined effect of last term's
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cases is to put more of the burden on the employer. An employer
is now more obligated to try to get a meritorious work force as opposed to simply a racially balanced work force. A racially balanced
work force is no longer enough to insulate the employer from liability if that racial balance was achieved only through hiring by
the numbers. An employer who fails to use merit as the hiring criterion-whether the employer discriminates against or in favor of
minorities-is now more likely to be liable under Title VII. The
overall result of these cases, then, is to switch the burden of eliminating discrimination from innocent white male workers to the
employers. That strikes me as a very salutory effect.

